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Abstract 
 
The paper develops a model for the screening mechanism for higher education, within 
an adverse selection framework. Specifically it examines the effect of wage earned by 
high school graduates on higher education participation. The model pinpoints a 
positive relation between the “high school” wage and the number of candidates 
entered in higher education with positive influences on the quality of selection 
mechanism. An empirical examination is conducted, using U.S. data, in order to 
investigate the validity of our analytical results. 
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1. Introduction 
 
       The admission of students to higher education is a challenging matter for 
educational authorities. This is a result of the fact that both parts face a dilemma. On 
the one hand, students must decide whether they will continue their education in order 
to acquire more qualifications or they will drop out early in order to enter the labor 
market. Their decision depends on a number of factors (i.e., wage, unemployment, 
abilities, etc.) prevailing at that time. On the other hand, the educational authority 
(usually the university) must decide on the number of entrants, based on the quality of 
the candidates and the cost per admitted student. The admission policy of top 
universities in the U.S.A. and Europe initiated a long debate among the academic 
community.  
  The literature which studies the relation between labor remuneration and 
participation in tertiary education is large and focuses mainly on minimum wage. One 
of the early studies on the effects of minimum wages on the youth labor market is that 
of Ragan (1977). Ragan empirically tested the hypothesis that minimum wage 
legislation reduces the fraction of youths employed and increases youth 
unemployment rates. However, this study focuses only on the employment effects of 
the minimum wage and ignores the important interaction between schooling, 
employment and the minimum wage. Neumark and Wascher (1995), examined the 
impact of minimum wage on employment and school enrollment for teenagers. By 
estimating a conditional logit model using state-year observations for the period 1977 
to 1989, they concluded that there is a negative influence of minimum wages on 
school enrollment and a positive impact on the teenage idleness. A study similar to 
that of Neumark and Wascher is that of Landon (1997). Landon used Canadian 
provincial-level data and showed again that there is a strong negative relationship 
between minimum wage and school enrollment. Moreover, he argued that this effect 
seems to be relatively persistent since an increase in education spending (e.g. better 
paid teachers, administrative spending on instructional supplies, other school board 
operating expenditures etc.) have no systematic effect on enrollment rates. More 
recently Pacheco and Cruickshank (2007) and Chaplin et al. (2003) reinforced the 
argument of the positive correlation between minimum wage and school dropouts.  
  Dickerson and Jones (2004, preliminary draft) presented a model where 
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individuals are heterogeneous in their educational abilities and they face an ex-ante 
uncertainty regarding their probability of success in higher education. The main 
finding of their paper is that the effect of the introduction of a minimum wage on the 
decision to work or continue in education is small. The main reason for that result is 
that the educational decision of individuals is mainly based on their anticipated 
probability of success and/or the rewarding wage premiums on successful completion 
of study. Hence, the impact of minimum wage is limited. In their work, Lipowski and 
Ferreira (2005) presented a multi-agent evolutionary model of student’s dilemma. 
They assumed that agents are heterogeneous regarding their ability and therefore their 
expected probability of success. One of their main results is that when the give-up 
payoff is high enough then only a part of the population aims at the university 
education. More specifically, only the high ability individuals (with high probability 
of success) decide to take the exams so as to enter higher education. As far as our 
knowledge is concerned, until now there has not been an attempt to study the effect of 
high school wage on university enrollment rates. Thus, we consider that approaching 
the specific subject might shed new light in our understanding of the decision 
mechanism of the would-be participants in the labor market.  
       In our analysis, we assume: 
• the ex-ante existence of a wage (high school wage) received by the individuals 
who either fail the examinations (and therefore not admitted in universities) or 
decide not to continue in full-time higher education. 
• a public sector which finances high schools and universities. The universities in 
turn conduct the examinations in order to select their students.  
According to our analysis, an increase (decrease) in high school wage, under 
certain assumptions, will increase (decrease) the number of admitted university 
candidates and the level of quality of education provided by high schools. 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives the 
results. Section 3 is devoted to the quantitative analysis of the model. Section 4 
concludes. 
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2. The Model 
2.1 Environment 
       We assume a continuum of risk neutral agents (university candidates), 
normalized to unity. Agents are of two types: either ‘good’ (type-g) or ‘bad’ (type-b). 
We consider that the ‘good’ candidates have certain characteristics (e.g., IQ abilities), 
which differentiate them from the ‘bad’ agents. Moreover, we assume a public 
authority which a) finances universities which are responsible for the examination 
procedure leading to the admission of agents to higher education and b) finances high 
schools in order to provide a certain quality level of education. The probability of 
success for an agent of type-i  is iP  (i = g, b) where Pg > Pb and this probability is a 
function of the quality of high school education (denoted by q) and the maximum 
affordable number of university entrants (denoted by η). The cost for participating in 
the examinations for an agent of type-i is iC , where iC  is a function of q and η, 
whereas the cost of not participating is equal to zero. If an agent passes the exams, he 
is admitted to the university and he gets a net wage u)1( Wτ−  after his graduation, 
where uW  is the gross wage and τ is the tax rate. On the other hand, if he fails, he gets 
the wage for high school graduates hW , which we assume that is not taxed. Moreover, 
we assume that hu WW >− )1( τ . The public authority faces the following costs2: the 
cost for the organization of the examinations denoted by k(η), and the cost for the 
provision of a certain quality level of high school education, denoted by c(q). For the 
purpose of our analysis, we will assume that the fraction of ‘good’ individuals in the 
total population is equal3 to p(q). 
  The properties of the aforementioned functions are stated in the following 
table: 
 
[Table 1] 
 
 
                                                          
2Indirectly, since these costs are paid by universities and high schools. 
3p is also a function of a number of factors such as inherited characteristics, family environment etc. 
which will not concern as here. 
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2.2 The Problem 
 
       Public authority faces the following adverse selection (screening) problem: 
since there is imperfect information regarding the abilities of the individuals, she must 
design a mechanism such that the type-g agents decide to participate the 
examinations, while the type-b to drop out and enter the labor market. If type-g agents 
enter the university then resources are allocated more efficient and growth 
perspectives (due to a future increase in human capital) are improved. The algebraic 
form of the above problem is: 
       
)1()],()()()()1([maxarg
0,
ηηηηη qCqpqckWWF ghuq −−−−+= ≥  
  
under the following constraints: 
 
)2()(),( qpqPg ηη ≤  
)3()],())[,(1()],()1)[(,( hghggug WqCWqPqCWqP ≥−−+−− ηηητη  
)4()],())[,(1()],()1)[(,( hbhbbub WqCWqPqCWqP ≤−−+−− ηηητη  
  
where ),()()()()1( ηηηη qCqpqckWW ghu −−−−+  is the objective function of the 
public authority, which is consisted by the total income minus the cost (private and 
public). Inequality (2) determines the affordable number of entrants to the universities 
(i.e., the capacity of the universities). Inequalities (3), (4) are self-selection constraints 
for type-g and type-b individuals, respectively. Inequality (4) ensures that type-b 
individuals will not participate in the exams, while inequality (3) ensures that type-g 
will follow the opposite direction. The key feature in our analysis which differentiates 
it from the rest of the literature is the fact that we incorporate in our model the cost 
and the probability of entering into higher education and we implicitly relate them 
with the level of high school wage. 
By separating the endogenous from the exogenous variables inequality 
constraints (2),(3),(4) take the following form: 
)5(0)(),( ≤− qpqPg ηη  
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)7()1(
),(
),(
uh
b
b WW
qP
qC τη
η −−≤−  
   
In the Appendix we present the mathematical analysis, i.e. the comparative statics of 
the model under consideration. Our main result is that an increase (decrease) in high 
school wage, increases (decreases) the number of students admitted in higher 
education and the quality of secondary education. 
Let’s try now to provide some rationale for the aforementioned results. An increase 
in the high school wages under the assumption that 1<∂
∂
η
gP  (see appendix), will 
decrease the right-hand side of the self selection constraints for type-g and type-b 
individuals. This will permit an increase in η without violating the self selection 
constraints (it can be easily shown that 
),(
),(
,
),(
),(
η
η
η
η
qP
qC
qP
qC
b
b
g
g  are decreasing in η). The 
increase in η is desirable for the public authority since it increases its objective 
function (the higher public cost, k(η) due to an increase in η can be offset by the 
increase in the total income and the decrease of the private cost, gCqp )( ). Thus, 
under this assumption, the derivatives show that an increase (decrease) in high school 
wage, increases (decreases) the number of students admitted in higher education and 
the quality of secondary education. The analysis is the same for the impact of high 
school wage on q. 
3. Quantitative Analysis 
       In order to verify the findings of our model, we used U.S. data over the period 
1973 to 2004 for the following variables: Total first time entrants in public higher 
education (denoted as pubs), real hourly wage for high school graduates in 2005 
dollars (denoted as whs), expenditures of elementary and secondary schools as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (denoted as exgdp), and mean Scholastic 
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Assessment Test (SAT) scores (denoted as sat)4. We use the SAT test scores as an 
index of the quality of high school education. Moreover, we assume that exgdp has an 
impact on the quality of high school education. In the rest of our analysis, we will use 
the natural logarithm (ln) of the above variables. The first step of our analysis is to 
test whether ln(pubs), ln(whs), ln(sat) and ln(exgdp) are stationary. Table 2 reports 
unit root test statistics of the augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) test (1981) and 
Phillips-Perron (PP) test (1988). The results in Table 2, indicate that all series are 
non-stationary and contain a unit root. In order to examine whether they are integrated 
of order one, I(1), we perform the augmented Dickey-Fuller/Phillips-Perron test on 
first differences. The results suggest that all variables are stationary in first 
differences. 
[Table 2] 
 
We examine the validity of our comparative statics results by: 
• Regressing ln(pubs) on ln(whs) (including constant and trend), using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), so as to check the relation between high school wage and 
the number of candidates admitted in higher education. 
• Regressing ln(sat) on ln(whs) and ln(exgdp) (including only constant), using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), so as to check the relation between high school 
wage and the quality of secondary education.  
Since, all our variables are I(1), we perform the relevant cointegration tests by 
making use of Engle and Granger methodology5 (1987) so as to avoid generating 
spurious results. The results of Engle - Granger cointegration test are illustrated in 
Table 3 and indicate the existence of cointegrating relations. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
By performing the appropriate tests, we get strong evidence of serial 
correlation in the residuals. Therefore, we use the following autoregressive (AR) 
specifications in order to eliminate this problem. 
                                                          
4The time series were obtained from the following sources: Economic Policy Institute: www.epi.org; 
National Center for Education Statistics: www.nces.ed.gov; College Board: www.collegeboard.com. 
5If the residuals of an OLS regression between I(1) variables are integrated of order zero (I(0)), then 
these variables are cointegrated. 
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where tu , tυ  are the disturbance terms and tε , tω  are the corresponding 
innovations in the disturbances6.  
Table 4 and 5 present the results of the Ordinary Least Squares regressions of 
(8) and (9), which in turn indicate that empirical evidence are consistent with the 
prediction of our model, namely the impact of the wage earned by high school 
graduates on the number of admitted candidates in higher education and on the quality 
of secondary education offered is positive.    
[Table 4] 
[Table 5] 
  
Moreover, we check the specification of our estimated models by performing 
various diagnostic tests. These tests are reported in Table 6. Our results indicate that 
our model seems to be fairly well specified and free from specification error. 
 
[Table 6] 
4. Conclusion 
       The present paper investigated a selection mechanism for higher education. To 
this purpose, we studied the impact of high school wage on: 1) the number of students 
admitted in higher education and 2) the quality of high school education.  
 The main result of our analysis is that there is a positive relationship between the 
variables under consideration. More specifically, an increase in the wage earned by 
individuals with low qualifications will create an incentive for not continuing in 
tertiary education. This development will further discourage low ability individuals 
                                                          
6The AR(12) specification in equation (9), may attributed to ‘intragenerational’ effects. 
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from trying to enter higher education. Therefore, the effectiveness of the screening 
mechanism in allocating resources more efficiently (low ability individuals enter labor 
market, high ability individuals enter higher education) and consequently increasing 
productivity, will be enhanced. On the other hand, in order to avoid educational 
‘leakages’ from the group of high ability candidates due to the decrease in the wage 
premium, public authority should mitigate this effect with an increase in the number 
of admissions in higher education up to the level where the aforementioned 
disincentive for low ability individuals will be preserved. At the end of the day, the 
entry of more high ability individuals in higher, education will increase the stock of 
human capital in the society, the return to it and the tax revenues in a faster rate. This 
in turn can increase the expenditures in secondary education and therefore the quality 
of the educational system and so on. Thus, policies aiming at the increase of high 
school wage can induce economic growth. The robustness of our analytical results 
was tested against empirical evidence from U.S.. Finally, we consider that further 
research in this field is required in order to decode the educational decision patterns of 
individuals and their interrelation with economic activity. 
 
Appendix A. Comparative Statics Analysis 
 
The first order conditions of the problem are: 
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Assume that two restrictions bind; the restriction of the maximum affordable 
number of university entrants and the self-selection constraint for type-b individuals. 
Our guess that in the optimum solution hu
b
b WW
qP
qC −−= )1(
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),( τη
η
, can be justified as 
follows:  hu
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 is described by all the indifference curves which are above 
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g
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qP
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η
 and hu
b
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qP
qC −−> )1(
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η
 is described by all the 
indifference curves which are below hu
b
b WW
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qC −−= )1(
),(
),( τη
η
. If we assume that the 
objective function of the public authority is increasing in q, η then the self-selection 
constraint for type-b individuals should bind. Moreover, we assume that we do not 
have a corner solution. 
Under this assumption in order to have a maximum [If the last h − (e + z) - 
where h are the unknown variables, e are the constraints that bind and z are the 
equality constraints - leading principal minors alternate in sign with the sign of the 
determinant of the largest matrix the same as the sign of (−1)h, then we have a strict 
local constraint maximum]: 
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Under the assumption that the constraint of ‘good’ does not bind, we get that in the 
optimum μ = 0. 
By total differentiating the 1,, Rq η∂
∂
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∂ ll  and 3R  with respect to hW , we get (in a 
matrix form): 
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Hence, the derivative of η with respect to hW  will be equal to: 
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The derivative of q with respect to hW  will be equal to: 
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Table 1: Assumptions about the Derivatives of the Main Variables 
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Table 2: Stationarity Tests 
 ADF test (lags) PP test (bandwidth) 
Variables in levels   
ln(pubs) -1.649    (0) -1.912    (2) 
ln(whs) -1.078    (0) -1.236    (1) 
ln(sat) -1.96      (1) -2.003    (4) 
ln(exgdp) -1.573    (0) -1.586    (2) 
   
Variables in first difference   
ln(pubs) -5.165***    (0) -5.198***    (3) 
ln(whs) -4.646***    (0) -4.646***    (0) 
ln(sat) -3.504**     (0) -3.398**     (2) 
ln(exgdp) -5.052***    (0) -5.052***    (3) 
Notes: Boldface values denote sampling evidence in favour of unit roots. *** and ** 
signify rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 1% and 5% level of significance 
respectively. The numbers in parentheses for the Augmented Dickey – Fuller (ADF) 
test are the optimal numbers of lagged difference terms, which are determined using 
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion). The numbers in parentheses for the Phillips – 
Perron (PP) test are the Newey – West bandwidth parameters of the Kernel – based 
estimator of the residual spectrum at frequency zero. Trend and constant were 
included in the test equation for ln(pubs), ln(whs) and ln(exgdp), whereas only 
constant was included in the test equation for ln(sat).  
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Table 3: Engle – Granger cointegration test 
 ADF test (lags) 
Residuals of regression of ln(pubs) on 
ln(whs) (including constant and trend) 
-3.849***    (0) 
Residuals of regression of ln(sat) on 
ln(whs) and ln(exgdp) (including 
constant) 
-3.225***    (1) 
Notes: *** signifies rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 1% level of 
significance. The numbers in parentheses for the Augmented Dickey – Fuller (ADF) 
test are the optimal numbers of lagged difference terms, which are determined using 
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion). The test was performed by the use of 
MacKinnon (1996) one–sided p-values. 
Table 4: OLS Results of Equation (8)  
Dependent Variable: ln(pubs)  
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 4.678*** 1.078 4.341 0.000 
trend -0.004** 0.002 -2.388 0.024 
ln(whs) 1.107** 0.411 2.691 0.012 
AR(1) 0.491*** 0.148 3.323 0.003 
R-squared 0.707    Mean dependent var. 7.515 
Adjusted R-squared 0.674    S.D. dependent var. 0.069 
S.E. of regression 0.039    Akaike info criterion -3.521 
Sum squared resid. 0.041    Schwarz criterion -3.336 
Log likelihood 58.576    F-statistic 21.686 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.497    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: *** and ** denote statistical significance at 1% and 5%,
respectively. 
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Table 5: OLS Results of Equation (9)  
Dependent Variable: ln(sat)  
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 6.783*** 0.066 102.079 0.000 
ln(whs) 0.141*** 0.019 7.446 0.000 
ln(exgdp) 0.073*** 0.010 7.037 0.000 
AR(12) 0.516*** 0.102 5.048 0.000 
R-squared 0.882    Mean dependent var. 6.919 
Adjusted R-squared 0.860    S.D. dependent var. 0.008 
S.E. of regression 0.003    Akaike info criterion -8.566 
Sum squared resid. 0.0001    Schwarz criterion -8.367 
Log likelihood 89.660    F-statistic 40.016 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.679    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: *** and ** denote statistical significance at 1% and 5%,
respectively. 
Table 6: Diagnostic tests 
Equation (8) Value of test statistic P-value 
JB 0.864 [0.649] 
Reset test 2.490 [0.127] 
LM1/LM2 test 3.346/1.943 [0.079/0.164] 
Equation (9) Value of test statistic P-value 
JB 1.116 [0.572] 
Reset test 5.116 [0.039] 
LM1/LM2 test 0.357/0.295 [0.559/0.749] 
Note: Figures in brackets represent asymptotic P-values associated with the tests. JB 
denotes the Jarque-Bera normality test of errors. The Reset test tests the null 
hypothesis of functional form misspecification. LM1/LM2 is the Lagrange multiplier 
test for first and second order serial correlation (under the null there is no serial 
correlation in the residuals up to the specified order). 
